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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine being caged in a six-by-eight foot cell, for twenty-two
hours a day, left with nothing to do but sleep, pray, and pace around
the tiny space. 2 The hot Cuban air is thick with humidity as iguanas
and banana rats run rampantly around your cell. 3 You are given little
more than a thin sleeping pad, a bath towel (to be used as a prayer
mat), and a copy of the Koran or another book.4 Before President
Obama's executive order was issued on January 22, 2009,
approximately 245 detainees being held at Guantdtnamo Bay (or
Guantdnamo) 5 were subjected to these conditions, without any notion
of a release, or even a trial date. 6 At the center of this controversy is
2. Guantanamo
Bay
Camp
Delta,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay.htm; US: Improve
Prison Conditions at Guantanamo, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 9, 2008,
available
at
http:!/www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/O6/O9/us-improve-prisonconditions-guantanamo.
3. Guantanamo

Bay

[GTMO]

"GITMO,'"

GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay.htm.
4. US: Improve Prison Conditions at Guantanamo, supra note 2. See also
Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut down
Guantnamo,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
21,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html. Since the opening
of Guantdnamo seven years ago, the prison has seen "four suicides, hunger strikes
by scores of detainees, and accusations of extensive use of solitary confinement
and abusive interrogations, which the Department of Defense has long denied." Id.
See also Six Years from Home - Guantdnamo Detainees from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 18, 2008, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/feature-stories/six-years-homeguantanamo-detainees-bosnia-and-herzegovina-20080118.
Lakhdar Boumediene, the detainee for which this case is named, participated
in at least a year-long hunger strike, as of January 18, 2008, to protest his detention.
Id. He was force-fed daily by prison officials while strapped to a restraint chair.
Id.
5. Throughout the text and source citations found in this article, Guant.namo
is accented (or not accented) according the original source material, to promote the
integrity of the sources.
6. See Mazzetti & Glaberson, supra note 4. As of January 21, 2009, the
number of detainees had decreased from 770, at the highest point, to 244. Id.;
Susan Candiotti,
Six Guantanamo Detainees Released, CNN.CoM,
http://www.cnn.con/2009/US/0 1/1 7/gitmo.detainees/index.html#cnnSTCText.
President Obama signed an executive order on his second full day in office,
ordering the close of Guantdnamo Bay within one year. As discussed later, this
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the Supreme Court decision Boumediene v. Bush, decided in June
2008.7 Boumediene, along with other alien detainees being held as
"enemy combatants" at Guantdtnamo Bay, won a victory in this case
by gaining access to habeas corpus rights, allowing them to challenge
the legality of their imprisonment. 8
Habeas corpus is the "primary tool used to challenge the
propriety of an individual's detention." 9 It originated in fourteenthcentury England to prevent kings from "imprisoning people
indefinitely without charging them with a crime."10 Habeas corpus
rights in the United States can be attributed to the Suspension Clause
in the Constitution, which states that habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in rare cases."' Habeas corpus has only been
suspended in the rarest of times in United States history. 12
Boumediene and other decisions have made it apparent, however, that
"there is no higher duty than to maintain [the writ of habeas corpus]
unimpaired."' 3
Since September 11, 2001, there have been several acts of
Congress that have significantly impaired habeas corpus rights for
detainees being held as potential enemies against the United States.
Both Congress and former President George W. Bush were quick to
enact legislation and protocols to manage enemy combatants and
non-citizens being held at the United States naval base at
Guantdnamo Bay. Notable acts of Congress-to be discussed further
below-include the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,14 and the

executive order may have been a consequence of, or the Obama administration's
response to, the Boumediene decision. See infra notes 243-255 and accompanying
text.
7. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
8. See id.; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006); see also infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
9. Deva Solomon, Can Government Indefinitely Detain Individuals Accused
of Being Enemy Combatants?, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 5155, 5158 (2008).
10. Alan Shapiro, The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus & Guantanamo,
TEACHABLE

MOMENT,

available

http://www.teachablemoment.org/high/supremeshabeas.html.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also Shapiro, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
13. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).

at
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Military Commissions Act of 2006,15 the latter of which stripped
federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions.' 6 The
past several years have seen an excess of relevant cases that
illustrates the progression of the United States' treatment of habeas
corpus rights, with regard to Guantdnamo Bay detainees.
On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court made clear its power and
ability to challenge Congress and the President.
Boumediene
answered the question of whether alien detainees (held at
Guantdnamo) should have access to habeas corpus rights with a
marginal yes.17
This case note analyzes the controversial
Boumediene decision and its potentially far-reaching implications.
Section II is a historical progression of relevant case law and
congressional enactments, while Section III looks at the significant
facts of the case. Section IV analyzes the majority and concurring
opinions, by Justices Kennedy and Souter, respectively, as well as the
two dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia.
Section V explores the probable impact of the decision in both a legal
and a broader setting. Lastly, section VI concludes the note.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Habeas Corpus / Suspension Clause in the Constitution
Habeas corpus is a Latin term that translates to "that you have the
body." 18 The writ originated in English courts in an attempt to
discourage the monarchy from holding an individual in custody
indefinitely.' 9 The English Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1641, which abolished the Court of Star Chamber, a court used to
hear sedition cases at the request of the King, with no right to
appeal. 20 Through the Habeas Corpus Act, Parliament established

15. See supra note 8.
16. Habeas
Corpus,

N.Y.

TIMES,

available

at

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/h/habeas-corpus/index
.html.
17. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).

19. John A. Sholar, Jr., Habeas Corpus and the War on Terror, 45 DUQ. L.
REV. 661, 668 (2007).

20. Id. at 669.
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that the writ could be asserted against any detention ordered by the
21
King.
In the United States, habeas corpus is granted by the Suspension
Clause in the Constitution, which states that "the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."'22 The
Suspension Clause is the root of the historical significance of habeas
corpus, but the question of exactly what it protects is "a difficult
puzzle. 23 During the framing of the Constitution, the "founding
of the system
fathers understood that the writ was an important part
24
Constitution."
the
by
created
of checks and balances
A grant of habeas corpus confers the remedy of release upon
those who invoke it, unless the Government can prove that the
detention is indeed lawful.25 The interpretation of habeas corpus has
changed dramatically with the Boumediene decision, expanding the
number of people that it protects.26 Even in our current, uncertain
times, as the United States battles the conflict known as the war on
Clause protects the
terror, "at the absolute minimum, the Suspension
''
writ of habeas corpus 'as it existed in 1789. 27
B. PresidentLincoln Suspends Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus has been suspended only a number of times;
arguably, the most notable occurrence was President Abraham
Lincoln suspending the writ during the Civil War.28 During the first
21. Id.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War of Terror, 120 HARV. L. REv. 2029, 2037 (2007).
24. Solomon, supra note 9, at 5160. See also Sholar, supra note 19, at 671.
At the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved that
"[t]he privileges and benefit of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall be enjoyed in this
government in the most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended
by the Legislature except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a
limited time not exceeding months." Id. at 672.
25. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23, at 2038.
26. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
27. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).
28. Habeas Corpus, supra note 16.
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few, crucial weeks of the Civil War, Lincoln suspended habeas
corpus, and instructed that anyone suspected of subversive acts be
arrested.29 When John Merryman (of Baltimore) was subsequently
arrested, then-Chief Justice Roger B. Taney ignored Lincoln's30
suspension of the writ and brought Merryman before the Court.
Taney demanded cause be shown for Merryman's arrest and then
ruled Lincoln's suspension of the writ unconstitutional. 3' Lincoln
32
and the military simply disregarded Taney's ruling.
On September 24, 1862, Lincoln publicly announced the
suspension of habeas corpus, in a proclamation in which he stated:
That the Writ of Habeas Corpus is suspended in
respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or
hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in
any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place
of confinement by any military authority of by the
sentence of any Court Martial or Military
33
Commission.
Months later, Congress validated Lincoln's suspension of the writ
with legislation, through the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863. 34 The
Supreme Court never received the opportunity to decide whether
Lincoln's suspension of the writ was an unconstitutional abuse of
power, mainly because the Lincoln Administration did not let the
issue reach the Court while the suspension was in place. 35 After the
Civil War ended, the Supreme Court officially restored habeas

29. Habeas

Corpus, THE

AMERICAN

CIVIL

WAR,

available at

http://www.etymonline.com/cw/habeas.htm.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Robert Longley, Bush and Lincoln Both Suspend Habeas Corpus,
ABOUT.COM,

http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/rightsandfreedoms/a/habeascorpus.htm.
33. Proclamation Suspending
the
Writ
of Habeas

Corpus,

TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG,

http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document-425.
34. Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).
35. Habeas Corpus, supra note 29. The administration thought the Court
would rule Lincoln's action unconstitutional, and "such a ruling would undermine
the war effort." Id. Further, by "keeping the matter away from the Court, the
administration could largely accomplish its policy." Id.
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corpus, in Ex parte Milligan.3 6 In this decision, all nine justices
agreed that Lincoln did not have the constitutional authority to
suspend habeas corpus, or to "establish a system of military justice in
37
areas where civilian courts were open and operating."
Interestingly, though, the Court admitted its own institutional
confines in periods of crisis. 38 Due to this "self-conscious
recognition," some scholars believe Milligan "stands as a symbol of
both judicial strength and judicial weakness in the face of executive
39
national security claims."
C. Relevant Case Law

1. Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950).
In 1950, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
enemy aliens should have access to habeas corpus rights to challenge
40 The Court's answer
their convictions in Johnson v. Eisentrager.

was no, in a decision authored by Justice Jackson. 4 1 In Johnson,
twenty-one German nationals engaged in espionage against the
United States, in China. 42 After being convicted by a United States
36. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 3 (1866). Lincoln and Taney were both dead
by this time. Habeas Corpus, supra note 16.
37. TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 6 (Peter
Berkowitz ed., Hoover Institution Press 2005); Milligan, 71 U.S. at 34.
38. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 109. The Court wrote:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not
allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary
to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question. Then,
considerations of safety were mingled with the exercise of
power; and feelings and interests prevailed which are happily
terminated. Now that the public safety is assured, this question,
as well as others, can be discussed and decided without passion
or the admixture of any element not required to form a legal
judgment.
Id.
39. TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37,
at 7.
40. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950).
41. Id. at 785.
42. Id. at 766. The prisoners were "convicted of violating laws of war, by
engaging in ...continued military activity against the United States[.] . . . Their
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Military Commission in China, the prisoners were taken to
Landsberg Prison in Germany to serve out their sentences.43
The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus before a United
States District Court.4 4 Once the case reached the Supreme Court,
the majority noted that there had been no instance in the United
States (or any other country where habeas corpus existed), where the
writ was issued to an enemy alien, who at no time during his or her
captivity, had been within the country's territorial jurisdiction. 45 The
Court stated six factors to overcome to determine whether a prisoner
is entitled to habeas corpus rights, namely that he:
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in
the United States; (c) was captured outside our
territory and there held in military custody as a
prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a
Military Commission sitting outside the United States;
(e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside
the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned
outside the United States.46
As the prisoners "at no relevant time were within any territory
over which the United States is sovereign," the Court gave further
emphasis to the location element. 47 The Court also expressed
deference to the Executive Branch, noting that the Executive
Branch's "power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by
litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to wartime security. 48
Justice Black's dissent, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton,
stressed "equal justice under law." 49
The dissent found it

hostile operations consisted principally of collecting furnishing intelligence
concerning American forces and their movements to the Japanese armed forces."

Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 768.
46. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 777. The Court found that the detainees were not
entitled to habeas corpus, when looking to the above six factors. Id.
47. Id. at 778. The prisoners were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States at all significant times. Id.
48. Id. at 774.
49. Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting).
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counterintuitive that the majority opinion precluded the notion of
even hearing a habeas petition solely because the imprisonment
occurred outside the Court's jurisdiction. 50 The detainees could not
expect to obtain relief from the German courts or any other branch of
the German government; only United States courts could inquire as
to the legality of the detainees' imprisonment. 51 The dissent
concluded with the notion that habeas corpus is an "instrument to
protect against illegal imprisonment, [and] is written into the
Constitution. . .
[O]ur courts [should] exercise it whenever any
United States official illegally imprisons any person in any land we
52
govern."
2. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
The first of the Guantdnamo Bay detainee cases to reach the
Supreme Court was Rasul v. Bush, in 2004. 53 This case involved two
Australian and twelve Kuwaiti citizens captured abroad during
hostilities between the United States and Taliban forces. 54 The Court
extended habeas corpus rights to the non-citizen detainees. 55 Justice
Stevens wrote the majority opinion that observed several key points
56
which distinguished the case from Eisentrager.
The majority spent much time opining on the status of
Guantdnamo Bay, noting that while the United States does not
exercise "ultimate sovereignty," it does exercise "plenary and
exclusive jurisdiction" over the area.57 This, combined with the

50. Id. at 792. Justice Black asked if a "prisoner's right to test [the] legality of
a sentence [depends] on where the Government chooses to imprison him?" Id. at
795.
51. Id. at 797.
52. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting).
53. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
54. Id. at 470.
55. Id. at481.
56. Id. at 476.
57. Id. at 475. Pursuant to a 1903 Lease Agreement executed between the
United States and Cuba, the United States recognizes that Cuba exercises ultimate
sovereignty over the leased area, while the United States enjoys "complete
jurisdiction and control over and within said areas ...[s]o long as the United States
of America shall not abandon the ...naval station of Guantanamo." Id. at 471.
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facts-that the detainees were not nationals of countries at war with
the United States, had denied plotting acts of aggression against the
United States, were never given access to a tribunal (or even charged
and convicted), and had been imprisoned for over two years-was
important because it distinguished these detainees from those in
Eisentrager.58 The Court noted that while Eisentragercategorically
"excludes aliens detained in military custody outside the United
States from the privilege of litigation in U.S. courts, . . [t]he courts
of the United States have traditionally been open to nonresident
aliens."59
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the opinion further explained
that Guantdnamo Bay is in "every practical respect a United States
territory. "60
Justice Kennedy also acknowledged that while
Eisentragerindicated that there was a "realm of political authority
over military affairs where the judicial power may not enter," there
are "circumstances in which the courts maintain the power and the
responsibility to protect persons from unlawful detention even where
military affairs are implicated.'
Justice Scalia's biting dissent scolded the majority for
"contradict[ing] a half-century-old precedent on which the military
undoubtedly relied. 62 Warning of the possible consequences, Justice
Scalia contemplated that the decision would always give courts the
authority to inquire into circumstances of confinement, and that the
Executive would be "unable to know with certainty that any given
prisoner-of-war camp is immune from writs of habeas corpus."63
Justice Scalia found it "breathtaking" that the Court "boldly

58. Id. at 476.
59. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
60. Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. Id. Justice Kennedy recognized that Eisentrager was a separation-ofpowers case, and that it should be applied to Guantdnamo detainee cases; yet,
Eisentrager should not preclude federal courts of all judicial review of Executive
military power. Id.
62. Id. at 488 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further maintained that the
holding was an "irresponsible overturning of settled law in a matter of extreme
importance to our forces currently in the field." Id. at 489. This dissent holds
many similar arguments made in Justice Scalia's Boumediene dissent. See infra
notes 168-176 and accompanying text.
63. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 495 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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extend[ed] the scope of [habeas] to the four comers of the earth," and
64
that it had overruled Eisentragerwith no acknowledgment of such.
3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a United States citizen was captured in
Afghanistan after he had allegedly taken up arms with the Taliban
against the United States. 65 After being labeled an enemy combatant,
Hamdi was taken to Guantdtnamo Bay; but, upon learning of his
American citizenship, was transferred to a naval brig in South
66
Carolina.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, first addressed the
threshold question of whether the Executive Branch holds the
authority to detain citizens as enemy combatants. 67 Justice O'Connor
postured that while the Government has never given criteria for how
it classifies individuals as such, that under the Authorization to Use
Military Force,68 Congress had at least authorized the detention of
American citizens as enemy combatants. 69 The next query the Court
70
addressed is the treatment of enemy combatants under due process.
Justice O'Connor turned to the Court's previous Mathews v.
Eldridge7' analysis, which judiciously balanced an individual's
private interests against those of the Government.72 With the

64. Id. at 495-99.
65. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 516 (plurality opinion).

68. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). See also infra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text.
69. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517. Justice O'Connor added that there is "no bar to
this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant." Id. at 519.
70. Id. at 524.
71. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
72. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor shows true
(and perhaps slightly naive, or overly optimistic) confidence in the justice system
when she adds that "[w]e have no reason to doubt that courts faced with these
sensitive matters will pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that
might arise in an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding
essential liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns." Id. at
539. More discussion of this balance is revealed when Justice O'Connor wrote of
the importance of striking a proper constitutional balance during this difficult
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employment of this test, the Court "imposed upon itself a framework
that would take into account both the liberty and the security interests
'7 3
at stake."
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Souter (in
part), derisively disagreed with the plurality's analysis.74 The dissent
saw the relevant issue of the case as whether imprisonment of a
citizen accused of wrongdoing lends itself to a different procedure
from alien enemy combatants. 75 Justice Scalia suggested that it
should, but thought the answer was to treat these citizens as traitors,
He showed disdain for the
subject to the criminal process. 76
plurality's "Mr. Fix-it Mentality," claiming that it "steps out of the
courts' modest and limited role in a democratic society . . . [to do]
what it thinks the political branches ought to do. . .. "77
4. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
The Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, held that the military
commissions thus far set up by the Executive Branch violated
provisions found in both the Geneva Convention and the Uniform

period of conflict. Id. at 532. She added that the plurality thought it "unlikely that
this basic process [of analysis] will have the dire impact on the central functions of
warmaking." Id. at 534. However, Justice O'Connor stressed that the Court has
"long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President
when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens." Id. at 536.
73. TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37,
at 14.
74. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 559. According to Justice Scalia, the Founding Fathers understood
that "a citizen's levying war against the Government was to be punished
criminally" as treason. Id. at 560. For Justice Scalia, Hamdi's situation was as
black-and-white as granting Hamdi a habeas decree requiring his release, unless (1)
criminal proceedings were promptly brought; or (2) Congress suspended habeas
corpus, as qualified by the Suspension Clause in the Constitution. Id. at 573; U.S.
CONST, art I, § 9, cl. 2.
77. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 576-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He practically mocked
the plurality's use of Mathews v. Eldridge, which was a withdrawal of disability
benefits case. Id. at 575. Further, Justice Scalia called for action from Congress to
ascribe conditions to suspension of habeas corpus, in the form of a Congressional
enactment. Id. at 578.
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Code of Military Justice.7 8 Hamdan, a Yemeni national, had been
charged for conspiracy, as he was allegedly Osama bin Laden's
personal driver and bodyguard.7 9 He was labeled as an enemy
combatant in 2004 by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(discussed below).8 °
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, noted that
while military commissions are obligatory in times of war, and "born
81
of military necessity," these commissions must have basis in law.
The Court felt that the type of commissions created by the Executive
"risk[ed] concentrating in military hands a degree of adjudicative and
punitive power in excess of that contemplated either by statute or by
the Constitution." 82 The majority also reached the conclusion that
the Detainee Treatment Act (discussed below) did not apply to the
hundreds of cases pending at the time of its enactment; it would only
83
apply to new cases.
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer added that "[n]othing prevents
the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he
believes necessary." 84 Again, Justice Scalia presented a vicious

78. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
79. Id. at 566, 570.
80. Id. at 570.
81. Id. at 589-90. Justice Stevens wrote that the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, the Authorization to Use Military Force, and the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (the latter two are discussed below) all acknowledge the President's authority
to convene military commissions; yet, the Court must inquire whether the
commissions are justified. Id. at 594-95. Critics argue that Justice Stevens's
opinion is "remarkable for its lack of humility" in that it "shows little recognition
of the President's unique role and capacities in foreign affairs." Douglas W.
Kmiec, The Rookie Year of the Roberts Court & A Look Ahead: The Separation of
Powers: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld - the Anti-Roberts, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 573, 575
(2007). This so-called lack of humility and perhaps lack of deference to the other
two branches of the Government arguably continues with the majority's opinion in
Boumediene. See also infra notes 131-156 and accompanying text.
82. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 601. The Court essentially sends the matter of
military commissions back to the Legislature, leaving Congress to change the laws
that the Court interpreted. Congress promptly did so with the passage of the
Military Commissions Act. See BENJAMIN WITTES,LAW AND THE LONG WAR 15
(The Penguin Press 2008); see also infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
83. See WITrES, supra note 82.
84. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636. Justice Breyer stressed that Congress had not
issued the Executive a "blank check," as discussed in Hamdi. Id. In essence, the
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dissent in which he criticized the majority for making "a mess of [the
Detainee Treatment Act]" and further, that the majority did not give
treatment to the consequences of the decision. 85 Justice Thomas
wrote an additional dissent in which he asserted that the President's
decision to create and try detainees under military
commissions
86
should be "entitled to a heavy measure of deference."
D. Authorization to Use MilitaryForce (2001)
On September 18, 2001, a Joint Resolution of Congress was
overwhelmingly passed, called the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF).87 AUMF gave the President the authority to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United 88
States by such nations,
organizations or persons.
The resolution opened the door to former President Bush's plan
for military occupation of Afghanistan and to use military force
against al Qaeda. 89 AUMF bolstered the American public's response
to al Qaeda by shifting the tone "decisively towards American
90
military power."

Court called for Congress to lay out legislative enactments that specifically
describe military commissions that comply with not only the Constitution, but also
international law. Id.
85. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 669. Justice Scalia thought the majority was
opening the door wide to a number of Guantinamo habeas corpus cases
"sufficiently numerous to keep the courts busy for years to come." Id.
86. Id. at 680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224

(2001).
88. Id.
89. Louis FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION AND 9/11 292 (University Press of
Kansas 2008).
90. WITTES, supra note 82, at 25.

614

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

29-2

E. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
In response to Rasul and Hamdi, the Bush Administration created
a system of panels it dubbed as Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs). 9 ' The CSRTs consisted of three military officers on a
panel, to provide hearings for each detainee. 92 The panels were not
used to determine the detainees' innocence or guilt, but whether they
were properly categorized as enemy combatants. 93 To make this
determination, the CSRTs heard classified government evidence, in
addition to directly hearing from the detainees in response to that
94
evidence.
For those detainees that were deemed by the CSRTs to have been
justifiably labeled as enemy combatants, the Administration formed
95
another layer of review in the administrative review boards (ARBs).
The ARBs did not re-evaluate detainees' statuses; rather, they made
annual assessments of whether a "particular detainee remain[ed] too
dangerous to relinquish from American custody." 96 Determinations
were made to either: (1) continue to hold the detainees; (2) transfer
97
them to the custody of another country; (3) or release them.
F. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
Ostensibly to comply with the rulings of Rasul and Hamdi,
Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) on December
30, 2005.98 The DTA set up a framework to handle the detention of
enemy combatants at Guantdnamo Bay, "consistent with the
procedures the government believed were required after Hamdi."99
The purpose of the DTA's "jurisdiction-stripping provisions was to
prevent detainees from challenging the legality and conditions of
91. Id. at 66.
92. FISHER, supra note 89, at 234. It was required that the presiding officers
had nothing to do with the capture or interrogations of the detainees. Id.
93. WITTES, supra note 82, at 66.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006); FISHER, supra note 89, at 243.
99. Solomon, supra note 9, at 5172.
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their detention."' 0 0 Section 1005(e) of the DTA stated that "no court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . [an]
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an
alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay,
10 1
Cuba."
The DTA contained what became known as the McCain AntiTorture Amendment, which was "intended to prevent abusive
interrogations by both the military and the CIA in its detention
10 2
facilities, which were then [in 2005] still nominally secret."'
Senator McCain was himself the subject of torture in North Vietnam,
and therefore took great effort to bar the "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading" treatment of detainees.10 3 Prohibited actions added to the
DTA included forcing detainees to be naked or perform sexual acts,
104
and waterboarding [simulated drowning].
G. Military Commissions Act of 2006
Congress's response to Hamdan, which struck down provisions
of the DTA, resulted in the enactment of the Military Commissions
Act (MCA) in October, 2006.05 The MCA provided congressional
authorization for military commissions, and expanded and amended
the DTA provisions regarding appellate review and habeas corpus
jurisdiction. 1 6 Section 948 of the MCA distinguished between
unlawful versus lawful enemy combatants. 10 7 Explicitly clear in

100. Sholar, supra note 19, at 664.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
102. WITTES, supra note 82, at 68.
103. FISHER, supra note 89, at 235-36.
104. Id. at 214.
105. Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and
the Geneva Convention, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 322, 327 (2007).
106. See generally Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006).
107. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. at 2601. An unlawful enemy combatant
was defined by the act as:

(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the

United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy
combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al
Qaeda, or associated forces); or (ii) a person who, before, on, or
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section 7(a) was Congress's intent to strip courts of jurisdiction to
hear habeas corpus petitions, and section 7(b) provided that this
stripping "shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,
and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after
the date .. which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, trial,
or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States
since September 11, 2001. ' 1 8
III. FACTS

In 2002, Lakhdar Boumediene (Boumediene) and five other
Algerian natives, all having gained Bosnian citizenship, were seized
by United States agents on suspicion of a plot to attack the United
States Embassy in Sarajevo.' 0 9 The men were transferred to
Guantinamo Bay and endured six years of imprisonment without
being charged or tried."
The men were labeled as enemy
combatants under the MCA."'

after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act
of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy
combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another
competent tribunal establish under the authority of the President
or the Secretary of Defense.
Id.
A lawful enemy combatant was defined as:
(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in
hostilities against the United States; (B) a member of a militia,
volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement belonging to
a State party engaged hostilities, which are under responsible
command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distances, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of war;
or (C) a member of a regular armed force who professes
allegiance to a government engaged in such hostilities, but
recognized by the United States.
Id.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 2636.
Shapiro, supra note 10.
Id.
See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
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The case first reached the D.C. District Court, under Judge
Richard J. Leon." 2 Boumediene and the other men filed habeas
corpus petitions, and the Government moved to dismiss the claims,
asserting there was no legal theory by which the court could issue a
writ of habeas corpus." 3 The court recognized that this case
presented a novel issue of law: whether there was "any viable-legal
theory under which a federal court could issue a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the legality of the detention of non-resident aliens
captured abroad and detained outside the territorial sovereignty of the
United States, pursuant to lawful military orders, during a
' 14
Congressionally authorized conflict." "
The court's conclusion for dismissing the case centered on the
AUMF, noting that the resolution, in effect, gave the President "the
power to capture and detain those who the military determined were
either responsible for the 9/11 attacks or posed a threat of future
terrorist attacks. Indeed, the President's war powers could not be
reasonably interpreted otherwise." 115 Because the AUMF indicates
no geographic parameters, the fact that Boumediene and the other
petitioners were arrested in Bosnia held no significance for the
court.11 6 The court also found that non-resident aliens captured and
detained outside the United States have no cognizable rights." 7
Finally, the court could not find an international, or United States law
or treaty, under which the court could issue a writ of habeas
corpus.1 8 For the foregoing reasons, the court held that there was no
viable legal theory upon which the court could issue a writ of habeas
corpus, and granted the Government's motion to dismiss." 9

112. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (vacated,
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)).
113. Id. at 314. The Government asserted that its motion to dismiss should be
granted on several bases: "(1) non-resident aliens detained under these
circumstances have no rights under the Constitution; (2) no existing federal law
renders their custody unlawful; (3) no legally binding treaty is applicable; and (4)
international law is not binding under these circumstances." Id.
114. Id.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 319.
Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
Id.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 327.
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The case was brought back before the D.C. District Court several
weeks later, before Judge Joyce Hens Green, in combination with
other Guantdnamo detainee cases. 120 Again, the Government filed a
motion to dismiss that the court granted in part and dismissed in
part. 121 The court found that the petitioners did have a Fifth
Amendment right to due process and that the Government's holding
them indefinitely as enemy combatants violated the prisoners' due
process of law. 122 Further, the court found that the Geneva
Convention applied to the Taliban detainees, but not the al Qaeda
detainees.1 23 Judge Green expressed that the term enemy combatant
124
was a vague term that needed further explication.
In 2007, Boumediene reached the federal Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit. 125 In light of Rasul, Hamdi, and Hamdan,126 the
majority ruled that the MCA, which deprived courts of jurisdiction to
hear habeas corpus claims of enemy combatants at Guantdinamo, did
not violate the Constitution's Suspension Clause. 127 The dissent
noted that the implementation of the CSRTs was not an adequate
substitution for habeas corpus, and that the detainees should be
entitled to a hearing on a habeas petition. 128 The detainees appealed
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 129 Thus, Boumediene was
brought to its apex, and was decided by the Supreme Court on June
12, 2008.130

120. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005)
(vacated, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 445.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 475.
125. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rev'd, 128 S. Ct.
2228 (2008)).
126. See supra notes 53-86 and accompanying text.
127. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 981.
128. Id. at 994-1011.
129. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242.
130. See id.
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IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, presents the majority opinion of the Court. 131 Justice
Kennedy begins the opinion by presenting and answering the key
issue of whether petitioners have a constitutional right to habeas
corpus, not to be withdrawn, unless the action conformed with the
Suspension Clause.' 32 The majority holds that aliens at Guantdnamo
do indeed have the privilege of habeas corpus. 13 3 Further, the
procedures for review set forth by the DTA are an inadequate
substitute for habeas corpus; therefore, § 734 of the MCA operates as
an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. 1
Part one of the opinion cites AUMF, Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan;
Justice Kennedy discusses the relevant elements of each, with regard

to Boumediene and Guantdnamo Bay detainees. 35 Part two opens
with the analysis of the threshold question of whether the MCA § 7
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 2240.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240-42.

Justice Kennedy recognizes that

AUMF authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, and persons. . ." believed to have been involved with
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. See supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
In Hamdi, a plurality of the Court recognized that detaining individuals had
been authorized by the AUMF; yet, there needed to be a system in place to
accurately label individuals as enemy combatants. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507
(plurality opinion). Thus, the CSRTs were created. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at
2241. The Boumediene petitioners all denied membership in al Qaeda, and yet had
all been labeled enemy combatants before separate CSRTs. Id. Each sought a writ
of habeas corpus before a D.C. District Court judge. Id.
The Court extended statutory habeas corpus rights in Rasul; the constitutional
issue presented in Boumediene was not reached in Rasul. Id. After Rasul,
Congress passed the DTA, which the Court held did not apply to cases pending at
the time of its enactment, in Hamdan. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). Justice
Kennedy notes that the Hamdan concurrence opened the door for Congress to
authorize military commissions; however, nothing in Hamdan "can be construed as
an invitation for Congress to suspend the writ [of habeas corpus.]" Boumediene,
128 S. Ct. at 2242.
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"denies the federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus actions
pending at the time of its enactment."' 36 The Court acknowledges
that the legislative history prompted Congress to pass the MCA and
that members of Congress, "determined the amended statute to be a
lawful one." 13 7 The Court's duty, however, is to proceed on its own
independent judgment; and in that judgment, the majority finds that
the MCA deprived courts' jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus
38
petitions.1
Part three of the majority opinion discusses whether petitioners
are barred from seeking habeas corpus either because there are
enemy combatants, or because they are located at Guantdinamo Bay;
this section is split into two subparts.' 39 First, Justice Kennedy
outlines the history of the writ of habeas corpus, from its historical
roots in England to American jurisprudence, focusing on the writ to
aliens and territories outside the United States.' 40 He then addresses

136. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242. Justice Kennedy notes that the majority
holds that the statute does deny such jurisdiction, "so that, if that statute is valid,
petitioners' cases must be dismissed." Id.
137. ld. at 2244.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2244-51. Justice Kennedy stresses that the "Framers viewed
freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept of liberty, and they
understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital instrument to secure that freedom."
Id. at 2244. He reaches even further back than the framing of the Constitution. He
begins his historical progression with the declaration of the Magna Carta "that no
man would be imprisoned contrary to the law of the land." Id. Even the King was
subject to the law, as the writ was viewed as a restraint of the King's power;
however, the writ "proved to be an imperfect check." Id. The Habeas Corpus Act
"was the model upon which the habeas statutes of the [thirteen] American Colonies
were based." Id.
The Framers of the Constitution were weary and distrustful of government,
which was the driving force behind the separation of powers doctrine. This
doctrine provides "Government accountab[ility] but also [secures] individual
liberty." Id. According to Justice Kennedy, this doctrine, as well as the substantive
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments "protects persons as well as
citizens, [thus,] foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigating in our courts
can seek to enforce" the separation of powers principles. Id. When the Suspension
Clause, supra note 11, was adopted, it was understood that it "not only protects
against arbitrary suspensions of the writ but also guarantees an affirmative right to
judicial inquiry into the causes of detention." Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246.
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the question of the extension of the entitlement of habeas corpus,
focusing on territories such as Guantdnamo Bay.14 ' The Government
argued that "there is no evidence that a court sitting in England
granted habeas relief to an enemy alien detained abroad;" petitioners
argued to the contrary, that "there is no evidence that a court refused
to do so for lack of jurisdiction. 1 42 Justice Kennedy notes that there
' 143
are "reasons to doubt both assumptions."
Section four of the majority opinion begins with a discussion of
the status of Cuba as it relates to the United States and whether
detainees held there are afforded any rights at all.'" Justice Kennedy
immediately recognizes that "Guantanamo Bay is not formally part
of the United States," yet through a long historical recount and
Justice Kennedy stresses that the Suspension Clause is "designed to protect
against these cyclical abuses" and protects detainees' rights "by a means consistent
with the essential design of the Constitution. It ensures that, except during period
of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to
maintain the 'delicate balance of governance' that is itself the surest safeguard of
liberty." Id. at 2247.
141. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248. The majority briefly looks to common
law, where habeas corpus applied only to British subjects, and notes that while the
geographic scope of the common law writ is informative, it is not dispositive.
Justice Kennedy notes that the common law writ ran to territories outside England,
like the Channel Islands and India. Id. at 2249. He distinguishes these
jurisdictions from Guant~namo by saying that while the former were "not in theory
part of the realm of England, were nonetheless under the Crown's control." Id.
The United States, though, does not maintain formal sovereignty over GuantAnamo.
The Government urged the Court to view Guantinamo like Scotland at common
law, where English courts lacked the power to issue the writ. Justice Kennedy
dismisses this argument by noting that "Scotland was no longer a 'foreign' country
vis-d-vis England-at least not in the sense in which Cuba is a foreign country vis-avis the United States." Id. at 2250. He continues by explaining that British law did
not generally apply in Scotland; but, has "no reason to believe an order from a
federal court would be disobeyed at Guantanamo." Id. at 2251.
Justice Kennedy then remarks, in comments reminiscent of Justice Black's
Eisentragerdissent (see supra note 51 and accompanying text), that "[n]o Cuban
court has jurisdiction to hear these petitioners' claims, and no law other than the
laws of the United States applies at the naval station.... This is reason enough for
us to discount the relevance of the Government's analogy" of Guantdnamo to
Scotland. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251.
142. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251.
143. Id. As a result, Justice Kennedy declined to infer too much, one way or
the other. Id.
144. Id.
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145
analysis, qualifies it as a de jure sovereignty of the United States.
He notes further that "[i]n every practical sense Guantanamo is not
146
abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United States."'
Concluding this section, the majority holds that the Suspension
Clause has full effect at Guantdnamo Bay, and as such, detainees are
entitled to habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their
detentions. 147
Section five of the majority opinion addresses the question of
whether Congress has provided an adequate substitute for habeas

145. Id. Justice Kennedy references the lease agreement between the United
States and Cuba (see supra note 57 and accompanying text), in which Cuba retains
"ultimate sovereignty" while the United States exercises "complete jurisdiction and
control."
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252.
Justice Kenney rebuts the
Government's assertion that the United States does not enjoy ultimate sovereignty,
and concludes that this does not end the analysis. Id. Again, the Court looks to
historical American exploration, noting that when "Congress exercised its power to
create new territories, it guaranteed constitutional protections to the inhabitants by
statute." Id. at 2253. The majority looks to noncontiguous United States territories
such as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines and opines that "[i]t may well be
over time the ties between the United States and any of its unincorporated
Territories strengthen in ways that are of constitutional significance." Id. at 2255.
The majority then distinguishes Eisentrager in a rather novel approach.
Justice Kennedy hones in on the fact that the United States lacked de jure
sovereignty and plenary control over Landsberg Prison, where the Eisentrager
detainees were held. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Justice
Kennedy maintains that:
[E]ven if we assume the EisentragerCourt considered the United
States' lack of formal legal sovereignty over Landsberg Prison as
the decisive factor in that case, its holding is not inconsistent with
a functional approach to questions of extraterritoriality. The
formal legal status of a given territory affects, at least to some
extent, the political branches' control over that territory. Dejure
sovereignty is a factor that bears upon which constitutional
guarantees apply there.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258. With these few sentences, the majority
basically overrules Eisentrager without explicitly saying so. Essentially, Justice
Kennedy calls the Eisentrageropinion flexible as to a functional test to each case.
It is doubtful that the majority justices in Eisentragerwould be as quick to accept
this functional test as it seems that opinion was definitive as to the status of alien
detainees. Justice Kennedy asserts that "[n]othing in Eisentrager says that dejure
sovereignty is or has ever been the only relevant consideration in determining the
geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas corpus." Id.
146. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2261.
147. Id. at 2262.
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corpus procedures. 148 The Court discusses the distinctions between a
previous challenge to habeas corpus, the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 1 49 and the MCA. 150 Justice
Kennedy also explains deficiencies in the DTA as a habeas corpus
substitute and concludes that these insufficiencies are too great for
minor tinkering.'5 1 Thus, the majority holds,152 § 7 of the MCA
"effects an unconstitutional [effect] of the writ."
Section six concludes the majority opinion and discusses the
timing of habeas corpus review.153 The majority notes that in some
instances of the detainees at Guantdnamo, six years have lapsed with
1 54
no judicial oversight or an adequate habeas corpus substitute.
Justice Kennedy maintains that the "costs of delay can no longer be
148. Id.
149. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
150. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263-66. Justice Kennedy explains the
restrictions of AEDPA on habeas review were not a complete suspension on habeas
corpus, as the Court held in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662-64 (1996), but
simply procedural limitations, such as petitioner's ability to bring new and
repetitive claims in multiple habeas corpus actions. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at
2264. The main distinction between the MCA and AEDPA, the majority
continues, is that AEDPA applies in practice to those prisoners serving a sentence
after having been tried in open court and whose sentences have been upheld on
direct appeal, whereas the MCA eliminates habeas review to those detainees whose
guilt has not yet been legally determined. Id. at 2266.
151. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269-74. Justice Kennedy avoids making a
judgment as to whether the CSRT procedures satisfy due process but does argue
that "even when all the parties involved in this process act with diligence and in
good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal's findings of fact." Id.
at 2271. As for problems the majority finds with the DTA, Justice Kennedy
remarks that that the DTA "does not explicitly empower the Court of Appeals to
order the applicant in a DTA review proceeding released should the court find that
the standards and procedures used at his CSRT hearing were insufficient to justify
detention" and that this is "troubling." Id. Further, the detainee would not have the
opportunity to present evidence discovered after conclusion of the CSRT
proceeding. Id. at 2272. Justice Kennedy is careful to point out that "[wje do not
imply DTA review would be constitutionally sufficient replacement for habeas
corpus but for these limitations on the detainee's ability to present exculpatory
evidence." Id. at 2274. This presents a clear message to Congress that the Court
wants to scrap the DTA and start anew with different legislation.
152. Id. at 2274.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2275.
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borne by those who are held in custody. The detainees in these cases
are entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing.' l5 5 The majority ends
with a perhaps hopeful statement as to our history and future; Justice
Kennedy writes "[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to survive,
and remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can
be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the
56
framework of the law."'
B. Justice Souter's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, submits a
concurring opinion. The concurrence is quite short and emphasizes
two key points.' 57 First, Justice Souter purports that this case
strongly asserts that habeas corpus reaches foreign nationals at
Guanttnamo Bay in not a statutory jurisdiction, but a jurisdiction that
is constitutionally based.' 58 Secondly, Justice Souter points out the
considerable length of the detainees' imprisonments, some of which
measured over six years. 5 9 Ending his concurrence, Justice Souter
remarks boldly, as a response to the dissent's accusations, that
"today's decision is no judicial victory, but an act of perseverance in
trying to make habeas review, and the obligation of the courts to
provide it, mean something of value both to prisoners and to the
60
Nation."'

155. Id.
156. Id. at 2277.
157. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 2278. Rasul extended statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantinamo
Bay, and this jurisdiction was subsequently eliminated by legislation. Boumediene
establishes that constitutional habeas jurisdiction does in fact exist for "aliens
imprisoned by the military outside an area of de jure national sovereignty." Id.
Justice Souter notes that whether one agrees or disagrees with the Boumediene
decision, it is certainly not "out of the blue." Id.
159. Id. Justice Souter notes that the dissent tries to assert that Boumediene is
symptomatic of "judicial haste," yet he rebuts this argument by emphasizing the
several years that petitioners have been incarcerated at Guantinamo. Id. at 2278
(Souter, J., concurring).

Rasul "put everyone on notice that habeas . . . was

available to Guantanamo prisoners," and it still took years to achieve this decision.
Id.
160. Id. at 2279 (Souter, J., concurring).
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C. ChiefJustice Roberts 's DissentingOpinion
Chief Justice Roberts presents a fairly reasonable dissenting
opinion which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito join. 6 ' His main
argument lies in asserting that the DTA and CSRTs adequately
protect any constitutional rights to which aliens captured abroad are
entitled, whether this relief is labeled as habeas corpus or something
else.' 62 The protections afforded to these detainees are of a military,
rather than judicial variety. 163 Chief Justice Roberts believes the
majority's findings are "particularly egregious" because the majority
strikes down the DTA as an inadequate substitute of habeas corpus;
yet, "fails to show what rights the detainees have that cannot be
vindicated by the DTA system."'' 64 He points out an inherent "Catch22" in what he views as the majority's flawed reasoning; as the Chief
Justice interprets the majority opinion, "any interpretation of the
[DTA] that would make it an adequate substitute for habeas must be
rejected, because Congress could not possibly have intended to enact
an adequate substitute for habeas."'' 65 Chief Justice Roberts accuses
the majority for resting its decision on "abstract and hypothetical
concerns."' 166 Ending his dissent, the Chief Justice forebodingly asks:
So who has won? Not the detainees. The Court's
analysis leaves them with only the prospect of future
161. Id. Chief Justice Roberts finds the majority's approach to the case

"misguided... [and] also fruitless." Id. at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

162. Id. at 2281.
163. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2281.

Not only did the DTA provide an

opportunity for the detainees to be heard in a CSRT panel, but also an opportunity
for review by an Article III judge in the D.C. Circuit. Chief Justice Roberts opines
that the Court's decision will only prolong the detainees' winding road through the

legal process, as it "add[s] additional layers of quite possibly redundant review."
Id. at 2282.
164. Id. at 2283. The Chief Justice added that:
Declaring that petitioners have a right to habeas in no way
excuses the Court from explaining why the DTA does not protect
whatever due process or statutory rights petitioners may have.
Because if the DTA provides a mean for vindicating petitioners'

rights, it is necessarily an adequate substitution for habeas
corpus.
Id. at 2286-87.
165. Id. at 2292.
166. Id. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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litigation to determine the content of their new habeas
right, followed by further litigation to resolve their
particular cases.... Not the Great Writ, who majesty
is hardly enhanced by its extension to a
jurisdictionally quirky outpost, with no tangible
benefit to anyone. Not the rule of law. . . . And
certainly not the American people, who today lose a
bit more control over the conduct of this Nation's
foreign policy to unelected, politically unaccountable
67
judges.'
D. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent joined by Justices Thomas,
Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts.1 68 The entire dissent is emotionally
charged and filled with harsh criticisms of the majority, as he speaks
of "the disastrous consequences of what the Court has done
today."' 169 His essential argument is that habeas corpus does not
extend-and never has been extended-to aliens abroad; therefore,
the Suspension Clause is not applicable and "the Court's intervention
in this military matter is entirely ultra vires."170
Justice Scalia declares that "America is at war with radical
Islamists."' 7' He also suggests that the Court's decision "will almost
certainly cause more Americans to be killed.' 72 Justice Scalia calls

167. Id. Most of Chief Justice Roberts' dissent remains fairly even-tempered,
until this last paragraph. These final words leak with emotion of worry and
warning. On the whole, the Chief Justice's dissent presents a reasonable argument
in distinguishing military from judicial channels for detainees' review. As he notes
several times, whether it is titled habeas corpus or something else, the DTA
adequately satisfied, and perhaps went far beyond, the most generous procedural
protections that have ever been afforded to any alleged enemy detainees in the
entirety of United States history. See id. at 2281, 2293.
168. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2294.
170. Id.
171. Id.

172. Id. He postures that the President and his legal counsel relied on "settled
precedent" of Eisentragerwhen the administration established Guantdnamo Bay to
house alien prisoners. Id. He continues on that the decision "accomplishes little"
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for "great deference" to the President and Congress; he asks "[w]hat
competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of
' 71 3
Congress and the President on such a point? None whatever."
According to Justice Scalia, "manipulation is what is afoot here."' 74
He maintains that there is no support for the Court's determination
that "constitutional rights extend to aliens outside U.S. sovereign
territory," and that the Court simply avoids discussing why
Eisentragershould be overturned. 75 Justice Scalia ends his dissent
with the ominous statement that "[t]he Nation will live to regret what
the Court has done today." 176

as even those who had been concluded not as enemy combatants had been released
only to continue monstrous crimes. Id. at 2294-95.
173. Id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia seems outraged that the
Court would take upon itself the power of this decision, and determine "how to
handle enemy prisoners in this war [when it is] the branch that knows the least
about [sic] national security concerns." Id.
174. Id. at 2298. Justice Scalia believes that the majority opinion distorts the
nature of the separation of powers doctrine inherently found in the Constitution.
Id.
175. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2302. Justice Scalia adds that "[i]t is a sad day
for the rule of law when such an important constitutional precedent is discarded
without an apologia,much less an apology." Id. He seems simply disgusted that
at the heart of the Boumediene decision was "an inflated notion of judicial
supremacy." Id. In continuing his rant on the majority, Justice Scalia proclaims
that:
Today the Court warps our Constitution in a way that goes
beyond the narrow issue of the reach of the Suspension Clause,
invoking
judicially
brain-stormed
separation-of-powers
principles to establish . . .habeas corpus. . . . It blatantly
misdescribes important precedents. ... And, most tragically, it
sets our military commanders the impossible task of proving to a
civilian court, under whatever standards this Court devises in the
future, that evidence supports the confinement of each and every
enemy prisoner.
Id. at 2307.
176. Id.
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V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION

A. Legal Impact
1. Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008
In the wake of Boumediene, several Congressmen were quick to
act in creating legislation that reflected the decision. The Enemy
Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008 was introduced by Senator
Lindsey Graham on July 31, 2008, to the Senate Judiciary
Committee. 77 The Act was "designed to comply with and
78
complement the edicts of the [Supreme] Court."
The biggest impact of the bill, upon its passage, would be the
streamlining of all Guantdnamo Bay habeas petitions to the D.C.
District Court.'79 The Government would have the burden of proof
in validating the individual's detention. 80 If ordered to release a
detainee from military custody, the Government would be prohibited
from releasing the individual into the United States.' 8 ' Further, the
prisoners would be transferred into the custody of the Department of
Homeland Security, while the State Department secured an
appropriate location for release.' 82 Ultimately, the bill did not make
it out of the Judiciary Committee and therefore was not passed by the
83
110th Congress.

177. Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008, OPEN CONGRESS,
available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/1 10-s3401/show. The bill was cosponsored by Senator Joe Lieberman, an Independent from Connecticut. Id.
178. Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act, JOE LIEBERMAN, available at
http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/ecdra.pdf. Graham and Lieberman's intent
also wanted to provide Congressional input on how to handle habeas corpus
petitions of Guant~namo detainees. Id.
179. Id. The D.C. District Court would be the exclusive venue to consider the
petitions. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Enemy CombatantDetention Review Act of 2008, supra note 177.
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2. What Boumediene Means for Detainees, including Lakhdar
Boumediene
Several recent decisions have been made concerning Guantdnamo
detainees. In October 2008, Judge Ricardo M. Urbina (of the United
States District Court in D.C.) ordered the release of seventeen
men. 184 The men were Uighur Muslims, a minority group found in
western China.' 85 The men had been held at Guantnamo for nearly
seven years. 186 Judge Urbina proclaimed that the men were not a
threat and rejected the Bush Administration's claim that he lacked the
power to set the men free into the United States.' 87 The Government
did concede that it was no longer attempting to prove that the
Uighurs were enemy combatants, but did say that the men admitted
to receiving weapons training by the Taliban in Afghanistan around
September 11, 2001.188 The Government vehemently argued against
the release of the Uighurs into the United States, while defense
counsel expressed concern at the men being taken into custody if
they were released into the United States' 89 To this, Judge Urbina
replied, "I do not expect these Uighurs will be molested by any
member of the United States government. I'm a federal judge, and
' 90
I've issued an order."'
184. William Glaberson, Judge Orders 17 Detainees at Guantnamo Freed,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
7,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/washington/08detain.html.
185. Id.
186. Anger over GuantanamoBay Ruling, BBC NEWS, Oct. 7, 2008, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7658045.stm.
187. Glaberson, supra note 184. Judge Urbina added, "I think the moment has
arrived for the court to shine the light of constitutionality on the reasons for
detention." Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Currently, four of the Uighur former detainees are in Bermuda, with
the intent that they will gain Bermudian citizenship. The four express no interest in
returning to China, their home country. Erik Eckholm, Out of Guanthnamo,
Uighurs Bask in Bermuda, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/world/americas/15uighur.html. The country
of Palau has agreed to temporarily resettle the remaining Uighur detainees as a
humanitarian gesture. Mark Landler, Palau to Take Chinese Guantdnamo
Detainees,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
9,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/world/l0palau.html.
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On November 20, 2008, Judge Leon (of the D.C. District Court)
ordered the release of Lakhdar Boumediene and four other men.' 9 '
Judge Leon held that the central claim against the men, a "classified
document from an unnamed source," was not credible enough to
keep the men in custody.' 92 Further, Judge Leon urged the
Government not to appeal. 193 As a Bush appointee, Judge Leon was
expected to be sympathetic to the Government's case, so the decision
was slightly surprising. 194 Boumediene and the others had been in
custody for seven years. 195 The other man involved in the
Boumediene case, Bensayah Belkacem, was found to be lawfully
held, as there had been some evidence that linked him to a "senior al' 96
Qaeda facilitator."'
As of December 15, 2008, the Bush Administration was
preparing to send three of the illegally detained men back to Bosnia
and Herzegovina, as ordered by Judge Leon. 197 The transfer may
have been a sign that the Bush Administration was willing to accept
defeat in the first of these habeas corpus petition cases, although two

As of October 20, 2009, the Supreme Court decided to hear the Uighurs' case
during its next term, and decide on the issue of whether federal courts are allowed
to order prisoners held at GuantAnamo released into the United States. Adam
Liptak, Justices to Decide on U.S. Release of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/l0/21/us/21scotus.html.
The
case concerns thirteen Uighurs who continue to be held although it has been ruled
that they no longer pose a threat to the United States. Id. The case will be decided,
despite the Justice Department's assertion that the men are "free to leave
Guantdinamo Bay to go to any country that is willing to accept them, and in the
meantime, they are housed in facilities separate from those for enemy combatants
under the least restrictive conditions practicable." Id.
191. William Glaberson, Judge Declares Five DetaineesHeld Illegally, N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
21,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/us/21guantanamo.html.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Glaberson, supra note 191.
197. William Glaberson, U.S. is Set to Release 3 Detaineesfrom Base, N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
15,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.con/2008/12/16/washington/ 16gitmo.html.
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men will remain at Guantdinamo. 198 One of the two men not
transferred was Boumediene himself, as his Bosnian citizenship was
stripped at the time of his detainment, due to questions about how it
was obtained.1 99 Nevertheless, as of May 2009, Boumediene was
20 0
released from Guantdinamo Bay to France.
3. Unanswered Questions
The Court left several issues unresolved after Boumediene,
including whether habeas corpus rights extend to alien detainees at
locations other than Guantdnamo. The Court did not draw a bright
line as to when detainees are actually being justifiably held. Further,
the Court gave no indication as to what conditions the prisoners still
being held should experience. 20 1 The Court has now shown, although
marginally, its intention of allowing detainees habeas corpus rights in
these tumultuous times of war and uncertainty; yet, Boumediene has
created many new legal queries related to Guantdinamo and its
prisoners, as well as prisoners held at other locations.
B. BroadImpact
1. Presidential Election 2008, and the Makeup of the Supreme Court
Constitutional scholars argue whether the Boumediene decision
signals a turn in the Court toward liberalism. Although the judiciary
was designed to function without the influence of partisan politics,
political undertones are evident when looking at the makeup of the

198. Id. The three men being transferred are Mohamed Nechle, Mustafa Ait
Idir and Hadj Boudella. Id.
199. Id.
200. So far, Boumediene is the only Guantdnamo detainee that French
President Nicolas Sarkozy has agreed to accept. Steven Erlanger, Ex-Detainee
Describes His 7 Years at Guantnamo, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/world/europe/27paris.html.
201. Tina Molly Lang, White House Loses Boumediene Case: Supreme Court
Sides Against Bush, Protects Habeas Corpus, ASSOCIATED CONTENT, June 12,
2008,
available
at
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/818683/whitehouse-losesboumediene
_casesupreme.html.
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current Supreme Court.202 Many legal scholars postulate that there
are four conservatives on the bench, four liberals, and one "swing
vote" in Justice Kennedy. 20 3 The conservative lineup consists of
Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts. 2° The
liberal wing includes Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and
Ginsburg. 5 Justice Kennedy's swing title is not simply an
erroneous label; in the 2007 term, he joined the majority in every 5-4
decision.20 6 In contrast to the 2007 term's twenty-four 5-4 decisions,
the 2008 term held fewer; only eleven cases were decided by 5-4
majorities.20 7 Kennedy himself dislikes the term "swing justice," as
he believes it "implies vacillation." 20 8 He is, however, "at the
fulcrum of most, if not all, close decisions." 20 9 Boumediene illustrates

202. See High Court not Political,Justices Say, ABOUT.COM, Dec. 12, 2000,
available at http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aal21300a.htm.
When
asked how much partisan politics factored in when deciding the Bush v. Gore
decision, Justice Thomas replied, "Zero." The 5-4 decision was hotly debated, and
led to accusations by many that partisan politics affected the ruling. Bush split
down ideological lines; the four dissenters were Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter,
and Ginsburg. Id.; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
203. See, e.g., Dennis Lythgoe, Supreme Court More Political Than It Lets
On, Lawyer-Writer Says, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695218152,00.html.
Jeffrey Toobin,
Harvard-trained legal analyst, spent a year researching his book on the current
justices that make up the Supreme Court, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF
THE SUPREME COURT. Toobin notes that Justice Kennedy "yields enormous
power." Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Marcia Coyle, In Review of High Court Term, Justice Kennedy Still the
Man in the Middle, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Aug. 8, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id = 1202423612323.
207. Id. There was also one 5-3 decision. Kennedy was in the majority of
eight of the twelve 5-4 (or 5-3) decisions in the 2008 term. The number of cases in
both the 2007 and 2008 terms remained equal, at sixty-seven in each term. Id.
208. Mark Sherman, Justice Anthony Kennedy Has Cast Deciding Votes in
High Court's 6 5-4 Decisions This Term, DEMOCRATICUNDERGROUND.COM, Apr.
7,
2007,
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=viewall&addres
s= 132x3204761.
209. Supreme Court Ends Term with String of Controversial Decisions,
FOXNEWS.COM,
June
28,
2008,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,373265,00.html.
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the divisive nature of the current Supreme Court. The decision is the
"poster child for how delicately the Court is now balanced."21°
On November 4, 2008, Barack Obama was elected the fortyfourth president of the United States. 21' The election marked the end
of a fierce campaign battle between President Obama and the
Republican nominee, Arizona Senator John McCain.212 Voter
turnout was high in an election with many crucial issues at stake,
including taxes, health care, abortion, gay marriage, the economy,
and the war on terror.213 For some voters, the candidates' possible
appointments to the Supreme Court played a part in deciding for
whom to vote.
During their respective campaigns, both Obama and McCain
indicated the direction each would bring to the Supreme Court, in the
potential justices they would appoint. Likewise, each had opinions
on Boumediene, which revealed another indicator of what kind of
justices each would appoint. 214 Senator McCain seemed very
troubled by Boumediene, while then-Senator Obama praised the
decision. 215 Both formerly advocated closing Guantdnamo Bay, but
expressed opposing viewpoints on Boumediene.216 McCain remarked
210. Marjorie Cohn, Supreme Court Checks and Balances in Boumediene,
USLAW.COM,
June
16,
2008,

http://www.uslaw.com/library/Human Rights Law/SupremeCourtChecksBala
ncesBoumediene.php?item = 171794.
211. See, e.g., Alex Johnson, Barack Obama Elected 44th President,MSNBC,
Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27531033/.

212. Id.
213. See generally Peter Wallsten & Janet Hook, Four Big Questions of the
Presidential Election, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 2,
2008, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-questions22008nov02,0,3848411. story?page= 1.
214. Kate Zernike, McCain and Obama Split on Justices' Guantdnamo
Ruling,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
13,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/us/politics/I 3candidates.html.
215. Id.
216. Id.; see Ed Henry et al., Obama Signs Order to Close Guantanamo Bay
Facility,
CNNPOLITICS.COM,
Jan.
22,
2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/22/guantanamo.order/index.html.
Obama's executive order to close Guantinamo received support from McCain,
although he noted concern that Obama should have considered where the prisoners
would go before hastily closing the prison. On a January 22, 2009 taping of Larry
King Live, McCain added, "So, the easy part, in all due respect, is to say we're
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that Boumediene "obviously concerns me. These are unlawful
combatants; they're not American citizens."21 7 McCain later added:
The Supreme Court rendered a decision which I think
is one of the worst decisions in the history of this
country... . Our first obligation is the safety of and
security of this nation and the men and women who
defend it. This decision will harm our ability to do
that.218
Obama, in contrast, said of the ruling:
This is an important first step toward re-establishing
our credibility as a nation committed to the rule of
law, and rejecting a false choice between fighting
terrorism and respecting habeas corpus. Our courts
have employed habeas corpus with rigor and fairness
for more than two centuries, and we must continue to
do as we defend the freedom that violent extremists
seek to destroy.219
With the delicate nature of the conservative/liberal split of the
Court, the ideology of potential appointees could dramatically affect
the makeup of the Court and future decisions. Replacing one Justice
could shift the balance profoundly, as "today's four dissenters could
become tomorrow's majority."220
President Obama could be
presented with three openings during his first term.22 ' Justice

going to close Guantanamo. Then I think I would have said where they were going
to be taken. Because you're going to run into a NIMBY [not in my backyard]
problem here in the United States of America." Id. Republican congressmen
expressed criticism at Obama's order, worrying that there is not a clear plan for
detaining and interrogating terrorists. Democrats, on the other hand, lauded the
decision, calling it "a first key step in restoring America's image and credibility in
the world." Id. See also infra note 243 and accompanying text.
217. See Henry, supra note 216.
218. Shapiro, supra note 10.
219. Id. Obama also added that Boumediene is a "rejection of the Bush
administration's attempt to create a legal black hole at Guantanamo." Zernike,
supra note 214.
220. David Espo, Analysis: Court's Course in Next President's Hands,
USATODAY.COM, June 12, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/poltitics/200806-12-1099091214_x.htm.
221. Robert Barnes, CAMPAIGN 2008: '08 Vote May Shift Balance on Court,
Hous. CHRON., Oct. 6, 2008, at A3.
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Stevens turned eighty-nine in December 2008.222 There has been
speculation that Justice Ginsburg may retire, especially after she was
struck with pancreatic cancer in early 2009.223 It was also broadly
rumored that Justice Souter wanted to retire so he could return to his
home in New Hampshire; Justice Souter confirmed this rumor when
he announced his retirement in April 2009.224 Prior to the election
results, legal scholars noted that if McCain wins, "the liberals will
stick it out as long as their health reasonably permits," while in an
Obama presidency, "the odds are these justices will take the
opportunity to retire. ,,225 When faced with his first vacancy on the
Supreme Court, President Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, who was confirmed August
2009.226

222. Mark Sherman, High Court Opens, Overshadowed by Election; Nov. 4 's
Results May Prompt Some Justices to Retire, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 5, 2008, at A3.
Justice Stevens fueled speculation as to his retirement when he hired only one law
clerk for the 2010 term. Normally, Justice Stevens would have hired three or four
law clerks for the upcoming year. David G. Savage, Speculation Rises that
Supreme Court Justice Stevens Will Retire, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-stevens32009sep03,0,5471894.story.
223. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Candidates and the Supreme Court, L.A.
at
available
2008,
7,
Oct.
TIMES,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinions/commentary/la-oe-chemerensky72008oct07,0,7696721.story; Bill Mears, Justice Ginsburg has Surgery for Cancer,
2009,
6,
Feb.
CNN.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/05/ginsberg.cancer.supreme.court/index.htm
1.
224. Id; Sherman, supra note 222. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court
2009,
30,
Apr.
NPR.ORG,
Retire,
To
Souter
Justice
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1 03694193.
225. Sherman, supra note 222.
226. Charlie Savage, Sotomayor Confirmed by Senate, 68-31, N.Y. TIMES,
at
available
2009,
6,
Aug.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/us/politics/07confirm.html?_r= l&hp. Justice
Sotomayor is the third woman to serve on the Supreme Court, and the first
Hispanic to serve. Id. Her confirmation was never much in doubt, due to the
Democrats' numerical advantage in the Senate. Id. During her confirmation
hearings, Sotomayor would only express that she accepts the Court's precedents,
and did not indicate how she would rule on any given case or issue. Sotomayor on
at
available
2009,
15,
July
TIMES,
N.Y.
Issues,
the
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/us/politics/16issues.html.
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During his presidential campaign, McCain noted that Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would serve as models for his
Supreme Court nominees. 227 Obama voted against the confirmation
of both Roberts and Alito and has said that his nominees would be
more like Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.2 28 President Obama's
appointees are crucial when looking to issues like abortion, for
example, and whether the Supreme Court will ever overturn Roe v.
Wade.229 Obama is pro-choice, and has said of abortion,
I think that most Americans recognize that this is a
profoundly difficult issue for the women and families
who make these decisions. They don't make them
casually. And I trust women to make these decisions,
in conjunction with their doctors and their families
and their clergy, and I think that's where most
Americans are. 3 °
Other prevalent issues likely to be heard by the Supreme Court in
the next few years besides abortion are gay marriage, school prayer,
and more on the war on terror. 231 Many argue that the recent,
controversial California vote on Proposition 8, banning gay marriage,
will eventually make its way to the Court's docket.232 A Supreme
Court Justice is appointed for life; his or her appointment affects

227. Barnes, supra note 221.
228. Chemerinsky, supra note 223.
229. See id.
230. Katherine Q. Seelye et al., NY Times on the Issues: Social Issues, N.Y.
TIMES,
available
at
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/abortion.htm.
McCain has
stated his disagreement with Roe v. Wade, saying "I do not support Roe versus
Wade. It should be overturned." McCain Says Roe v. Wade Should Be Overturned,
MSNBC, Feb. 18, 2007, availableat http://www.msnbc.msn.corn/id/17222147/.
231. Patrick Healy, Seeking to Shift Attention to Judicial Nominees, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at AO.
232. Brian Gray, A FederalBailoutfor Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008,
available
at
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-gray 172008nov17,0,3307805.story. Some legal scholars believe that there is an inherent
Constitutional flaw in Prop. 8; it arguably violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection clause. This Constitutional question could catapult the issue to
the Supreme Court. Id. The Court heard a similar case, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996), based on a Colorado amendment which rejected gay rights. Id. In
Romer, the Court ruled against the amendment. Id.
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every American through the law that each Justice helps to interpret.
Obama has described desired traits of his potential nominees:
What I do want is a judge who is sympathetic enough
to those who are on the outside, those who are
vulnerable, those who are powerless, those who can't
have access to political power and as a consequence
can't protect themselves from being . . . dealt with

sometimes unfairly, that the courts become a refuge
for justice.233
Hopefully the Court (including Justice Sotomayor and other
future appointees) can truly become a "refuge for justice," and lead
the country in the right direction with regard 234
to coming together, and
working toward greater prosperity and peace.
2. Closing Guantdnamo Bay
Another result of the Boumediene decision is the now-imminent
closing of Guantdnamo Bay. The Supreme Court, in Boumediene,
did not order all detainees who have not been charged, to be released,
nor did it order that the base be shut down. 235 The inhumane
conditions, detainees being held there without being charged, and the
enigmatic, controversial nature of the prison have all been factors in
support of closing it. 236 As of late October 2008, the Bush
Administration expressed the desire to close Guantdnamo before
leaving office, but admitted that it was not going to happen during
Bush's tenure as President.237 United States Defense Secretary
Robert Gates remarked that the next congress and administration
should "try again soon after they take office in January. 238 Bush's
White House Press Secretary Dana Perino stated in October 2008,

233. See Healy, supra note 231.
234. Id.

235. James Ross, Supreme Court to Bush: You're not Above the Law, HUMAN
WATCH,
June
13,
2008,
available
at

RIGHTS

http://hrw.org/enlgish/docs/2008/06/13/usintl 9126.htm.
236. Al Pessin, Guantanamo Alternative Eludes Bush Administration,
NEwsVOA.COM, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/English/2008-10-21-

voa64.cfm.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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that "[t]he next president will come in and realize how complicated
[I]t's not as easy as just snapping your fingers and
this issue is ....
239
closing Guantanamo Bay."
In the period after Obama was elected, but had yet to take office,
the new administration signaled its intent to close the prison
immediately. 240 While the decision to determine what to do with the
current detainees posed a difficult query, the administration
pronounced that closing Guantdtnamo would "create a global wave of
diplomatic and popular goodwill that could accelerate the transfer of
some detainees to other countries." 241 The closing could also
potentially impact how future captures of terrorism suspects are
effectuated, and could even lead to outlawing all torture techniques
24 2
employed by the United States.

On President Obama's second full day of office, January 22,
2009, he signed an executive order directing the Central Intelligence
Agency to close down Guantdinamo within one year. 243 The order
as
specifically states that the prison "shall be closed as soon 244
order.,
this
of
date
the
from
year
one
than
later
no
and
practicable,
This order fell in line with Obama's campaign promise to return
America to a "moral high ground" with regard to the war on
terrorism.245 President Obama said in his Inauguration speech, that
239. Dana Perino, White House Press Secretary, Remarks at a Press
Conference (Oct. 21, 2008).
240. Peter Finn, Guantanamo Closure Called Obama Priority, WASH. POST.
Nov. 12, 2008, at A01.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Mazzetti & Glaberson, supra note 4. Three other related executive
orders were also signed at the same time. One order formally banned torture,
requiring the use of the Army field manual as a guide for any terror interrogations;
another order established an "inter-agency task force to lead a systematic review of
detention policies and procedures and a review of all individual cases;" yet another
order delayed the trial of Ali al-Marri, a legal U.S. resident who has been
contesting his imprisonment for five years while being held without charges.
Henry, supra note 216.
244. USA: The Promise of Real Change. PresidentObama'sExecutive Orders
on Detentions and Interrogations, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 30, 2009,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/015/2009/en/
available
at
7e94375c-eeca-l1dd-blbd-6368flb61c3f/amr510152009eng.html.
245. Henry, supra note 216. Obama's reasoning for closing Guantdnamo was
to "restore the standards of due process and the core constitutional values that have

Fall 2009

"Yes, We Can"

639

"[o]ur Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine,
drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a
charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light
246
the world, and we will not give them up for expedience's sake."
The main concern that closing the prison presents is where to
house the remaining detainees. 247 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
(who remains in his post from the position under Bush) explained
that the current administration has "developed some options in terms
of how many we think could be returned to other countries to take
them. That diplomatic initiative has not started. That will await work
in carrying out the executive order." 248 Prison location options inside
the United States include military prisons Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;
Camp Pendleton, California; and Charleston, South Carolina. 249 Also
under consideration is the Supermax prison in Florence, Colorado.2
There is a possibility that sixty to one hundred twenty detainees
might be considered "low-threat detainees" and transferred to other
countries. 251 Yet another possibility is to transfer detainees back to
their home nations for imprisonment. 25 2 As for the detainees being
imprisoned in the United States, many members of Congress
vehemently oppose that plan.253 Gates said that of the potential
prisons identified in the United States for transfer of the detainees,
that he has "heard from members of Congress [representing] where
all those prisons are located. Their enthusiasm is limited., 254 As of
made this country great even in the midst of war, even in dealing with terrorism."
Id.
246. Paula Newton, Open or Closed, Guantanamo Hurts US., Ex-Inmate
Says,
CNNPOLITICS.COM,
Jan.
22,
2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/0 1/2 1/guantanamo.justice/index.html.

247. Henry, supra note 216.
248. Id.
249. David Espo, Obama to Sign Order Shutting Gitmo, AOL NEWS, Jan. 21,

2009, available at http://news.aol.com/article/obama-moves-to-suspend-gitmotrials/310186.
250. Id.

251. Id. As of January, 2009, only Portugal has agreed to take the detainees,
though "diplomatic discussions [with other countries] are ongoing." Id.
252. Id.

253. Id.
254. Henry, supra note 216. Most congressional critics of housing the
detainees in the United States note concern that the transfer will give the detainees
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September 2009, Guantdnamo Bay remains open, as the Obama
Administration struggles with the "legal, political, and logistical
problems" in attempting to close the detention center.255
3. Checks and Balances on the Supreme Court
Boumediene begs speculation as to the extent of the Supreme
Court's power. Article III of the Constitution sets up the Judiciary,
within a system of checks and balances among the Executive and
Legislative branches. 256 In Boumediene, the Court struck down an
act of Congress (the MCA), and made jabs at the Bush
Administration and its war on terror. 7 While many liberals may
wax lyrical at the Boumediene decision, many conservatives are
weary that the Court is overstepping its bounds as an impartial
judiciary.258 However, inherent in the Constitution is a separation of
powers among the three branches, so that no one branch may
overreach its power. 259 The Legislative branch makes the laws; the
Executive branch enforces the laws; the Judiciary interprets the
260
laws.

full constitutional rights, and further question what the detainees' legal status will
be. Id.
255. David Johnston and Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Faces Hurdles in
Closing Guantinamo, N.Y. TIMES, July
13,
2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/us/politics/14gitmo.html. Although there is
growing concern that President Obama will not meet his January, 2010 deadline of
closing Guantdnamo, Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson said in
September, 2009, that "[w]e [the administration] remains committed to doing this
on the deadline the president set [despite] many challenges." Josh Gerstein, Obama
Admin Still "Committed" to January Gitmo Closing, POLITICO, Sept. 10, 2009,
available
at
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0909/
Obamaadminstillcommitted to January-Gitmo-closing.html.
256. ConstitutionalTopic: Checks and Balances, U.S. CONSTITUTION ONLINE,

http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop-cnb.html.
257. See generallyBoumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2240.
258. Michael C. Dorf, Did the Supreme Court Violate or Vindicate the
Constitution in the Latest Guantanamo Bay Decision? The Difference Between
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances, FINDLAW.COM, June 16, 2008,
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/dorf/20080616.html.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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Boumediene's dissenters argue that despite separation of powers,
courts typically give deference to the other political branches in
wartime.261 The majority declined to give any notion of deference.262
While the dissent wanted to place trust in Congress and the President
to make right decisions in times of war, the majority in Boumediene
believed that "Congress and especially this particular President had
shown themselves unworthy of that trust., 263 Despite the decision
and the seemingly apparent affront by the Court, President Bush has
agreed to honor the ruling.2 6
4. Timing of the Decision
Historically, Congress and the Supreme Court have deferred to
popular presidents, such as Franklin Roosevelt (FDR), or John F.
Kennedy (JFK).2 6 5 In times of politically weak presidents, the other

261. Id.
262. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240-78.
263. Dorf, supra note 258.
264. Ross, supra note 235. President Bush disagreed with the ruling but said
"we will abide by the court's decision." Id.
265. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, A Life in Brief, AMERICAN PRESIDENT - AN
ONLINE REFERENCE RESOURCE, MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, available at
http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/fdroosevelt/essays/biography/ 1.
FDR's presidency centered on the Great Depression and World War II. His
presidency was so popular that he remained in office for twelve years. FDR's New
Deal policies legislation to reform the banking sector, in attempts to "resuscitate
American industry." Id. FDR also committed the United States to war against
Germany and its allies in World War II. "Under Roosevelt's leadership, the United
States emerged from World War II as the world's foremost economic, political, and
military power." Id.
It is rather easy to state that FDR is one of the most popular presidents in
United States history. Notwithstanding this fact, FDR issued an executive order
during World War II which authorized the removal of people of Japanese descent
from the Pacific Coast. TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 37, at 9. As the war continued, the Supreme Court found the curfews
and exclusions to be constitutional. /d; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
217 (1944). Justice Hugo Black wrote for the majority, that the Court was "unable
to conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to
exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they
did." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
See Michael Martin, The Turbulent Term of PresidentKennedy, THE HISTORY
PLACE,
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branches attempt to compensate, and sometimes make decisions that
disagree with the Executive Branch.266
The Supreme Court
essentially used Boumediene to give the Bush Administration, and
Congress, a legal lecture, or even a slap on the wrist.
The timing of the decision, almost seven years after the events of
September 11, 2001, is interesting when looking at the decision's
majority opinion. It is hard to imagine that in the months following
the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, when national
solidarity soared, that any justice would have decided Boumediene
the way the majority did. Thousands of American citizens were
killed on September 11, and the nation was looking for someone to
blame. Emotions were running high at that time; would the outcome
of Bournediene been the same years earlier?
Thoughts turn to different times in history; would this judiciary
have extended habeas corpus to others in previous times of war? It is
unlikely that during World War II, or the Vietnam War, that any Nazi
or Vietcong war criminals would have been afforded habeas corpus
rights. The current distinction lies in the fact that the United States is
not at war with a singular country, but a hidden enemy, called al
Qaeda, or even terrorism at large. This broad enemy is not a
specified target, like Germany or North Vietnam.
Moreover,
Guantdnamo Bay (in its current function) was not in existence in
historical times of war, so any answer to the question of whether
habeas corpus would have existed then is mere speculation at best.
VI. CONCLUSION

While some may view the Boumediene decision as a positive step
for civil rights, others may be terrified by the possibility of it
emboldening terrorists. The ongoing struggle of civil liberties versus
national security rages on; yet, those touting the civil liberty scale

http://www.kl2.nf.ca/gc/SocialStudies/whist3201/World%2OHistory/MMartin/turb

ulentterm.htm. JFK's presidency is known as "The New Frontier."

Congress

passed legislation that was sponsored by the administration. Congress and the
Court supported JFK through a very difficult presidency, which included turbulent

trials such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion in Cuba, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Civil
Rights and the Space Race. Id.
266. See, e.g., Franklin Delano Roosevelt, A Life in Brief supra note 265 and

accompanying text.
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won a victory in this case. Boumediene held that anyone being held
is permitted to challenge his
in a de facto United States territory
267
corpus.
habeas
through
detention
The actions thus far of federal judges, such as Judges Urbina and
Leon, could "set the stage for the release of dozens more detained" at
Guantdnamo in the near future. 268 Further, with the executive orders
issued by President Obama forty-eight hours after he had taken
office, the closing of Guantdnamo is inevitable. 269 Groups such as
Amnesty International urge the administration to use all due urgency
to close the prison, as fair trials for the current detainees are years
overdue. 270 Further, the prison has become a "damaging symbol to
271

the world.",

Closing Guantdnamo Bay presents many issues and questions,
mainly: where will the current detainees be placed? 27 2 There are
many options for the placement of the detainees, including transfer to
prisons inside the United States, to other countries such as Portugal,
or back to their home countries. 273 More detainees may even be
274
released entirely.
More than one year after the Boumediene ruling, "a majority of
the Guanttnamo detainees have not yet had a habeas corpus hearing
on the merits of their claims., 275 This may have been symptomatic
of the previous administration's unwillingness to cooperate with the
ruling, simply slow movement of the Government, or perhaps valid
discussion on what to do with the detainees. Much is still uncertain
regarding the detainees and how the war on terror will continue.

267. Ross, supra note 235.
268. Anger over GuantanamoBay Ruling, supra note 186.
269. See supra notes 243-246 and accompanying text.
270. USA: The Promise of Real Change. President Obama'sExecutive Orders
on Detentions and Interrogations,supra note 244.
271. Mazzetti & Glaberson, supra note 4. See Newton, supra note 246.
Former GuantAnamo inmate Moazzam Begg remarked that GuantAnamo is the
"most notorious prison on earth." Id. Begg also observed that Guantdnamo serves
as a "radicalizing force for militants around the world." Id.
272. See supra notes 247-255 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 249-255 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 249-255 and accompanying text.
275. USA: The Promiseof Real Change. PresidentObama's Executive Orders
on Detentions and Interrogations,supra note 244.
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What is certain, however, is that Boumediene illustrates the
Supreme Court's willingness to strike down actions of an unpopular
President and Congress. 27 6 The decision may signal a movement
toward the left on the Court, a heightened exertion of its own power,
or, perhaps, is just one decision that the Court happened to decide
liberally. The country will wait with hope for the Supreme Court's
next term, more justices to be appointed in President Obama's tenure,
the fates of the remaining detainees to be determined in the near
future, and the closing of Guantdnamo Bay.

276. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.

